The Police Ombudsman investigation into the La Mon House bombing has concluded that a ‘well-resourced’ RUC investigation which showed ‘earnest endeavour’ was compromised after the confessions of a man who alleged he had been assaulted by police during his detention, were deemed inadmissible by a trial judge.
The Police Ombudsman investigation into the La Mon House bombing has concluded that a ‘well-resourced’ RUC investigation which showed ‘earnest endeavour’ was compromised after the confessions of a man who alleged he had been assaulted by police during his detention, were deemed inadmissible by a trial judge.
The conclusion is contained in a report published today (11 December 2024) detailing the findings of the Police Ombudsman’s investigation into the 1978 atrocity, in which 12 people were murdered by a Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) bomb, and many more were injured.
The report considers the effectiveness of the RUC investigation, including the resulting prosecutions which were brought against two men, one who was convicted of 12 counts of manslaughter in 1981, and the other who was acquitted during his trial in 1980.
At the trial, the judge said he could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the man’s statements had not been ‘adduced by torture or inhuman or degrading treatment’ and the statements were excluded. In the absence of other evidence, the case was dismissed.
The judge’s observations and outcome of the trial point to what Paul Holmes, Senior Director of Investigations with the Police Ombudsman’s Office, called ‘a violation of the rule of law by the police officers involved’.
The bombing
The bomb at La Mon House exploded at 9pm on Friday 17 February 1978, when an estimated 500 people were on the premises.
The 12 people murdered included three married couples, and others who died were also related to each other. Many of those who were seriously injured in the bombing also lost loved ones. They were among 40 guests attending an Irish Collie Club dinner being held in the venue’s Peacock Room.
Witness accounts suggest that the improvised explosive device was placed outside the Peacock Room between 7.45pm and 8.25pm.
A first warning call was received at 8.51pm by an emergency operator and, at 8.57pm, a police officer at Newtownards RUC station was informed and dispatched officers to attend the venue.
A second bomb warning call was made too late, at 9.04pm, four minutes after the bomb had exploded.
PIRA was suspected of carrying out the bombing from the outset, and admitted responsibility a number of days later, stating that the warning given was ‘totally inadequate’.
The Police Ombudsman investigation into allegations about the RUC investigation made by survivors and victims’ families, began in 2021.
It generated more than 150 investigative actions, and investigators reviewed more than 700 documents, including the available RUC files, information held by the PSNI, and additional material from the Public Prosecution Service (PPS) and the Coroners Service for Northern Ireland.
Arrests
Among the concerns of the survivors and bereaved was that none of those who ordered, planned and directed the attack, or who made and planted the bomb, have ever been prosecuted and convicted.
The Police Ombudsman investigation established that the RUC had a coordinated strategy to arrest suspected PIRA members and those suspected of the La Mon House attack. This strategy was also intended to disrupt PIRA activity generally in the wake of the bombing and led to 35 arrests within the first days of the murders.
In the absence of admissions, or other corroborative evidence, however, none were charged with the bombing in the initial wave of arrests.
Over 40 people were arrested in connection with the bombing between February 1978 and June 1991.
Two PIRA members were charged with the murders. One man who admitted having hijacked a car used in the bombing and having been party to planting the bomb, was convicted in September 1981 and received 12 life sentences for manslaughter. The second person was acquitted at trial.
No-one else has been charged with offences in relation to the La Mon House atrocity.
The first prosecution and acquittal
One person, named in intelligence as having been involved in the bombing, was arrested by police in the first wave of arrests which followed the attack in February 1978, and released.
He was subsequently re-arrested later that year, in September 1978, and during interviews, admitted that he was a member of PIRA, that he had supplied the bomb used at La Mon House and that it had been ‘his team’ which carried out the bombing. He also provided police with names of other individuals involved.
He was charged with the 12 murders at La Mon House and with membership of PIRA, as well as 36 other terrorist-related offences.
Allegations that he had been verbally and physically abused during his detention in February 1978 were investigated by police and not proven. He made further allegations that following his second arrest, he had been assaulted in custody by a number of police officers.
He entered a ‘not guilty’ plea during his trial in 1980, asserting that his statements were inadmissible, as they had been obtained by torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.
In April that year, the trial judge excluded the confessional statements, saying he found that the accused: ‘maintained a remarkable consistency in his evidence about the infliction of ill treatment during a long and searching cross examination by [the prosecution]…I was very much struck by this, contrasting so vividly, as it did, with the obvious unreliability of other parts of his evidence’.
The judge also expressed disquiet at the conduct of police officers throughout the interview process at Castlereagh RUC station and was not impressed by the evidence of officers who allegedly ill-treated the man while in custody.
“The nature of police conduct alleged by the man on trial not only threatened to tarnish the integrity of the La Mon House bombing investigation, but also failed to serve the confidence and interests of the victims and survivors, the wider public and the interests of justice.
“I also find that the police officer who communicated the outcome of the trial to the divisional commander saying that ‘at no time during the ruling which lasted nearly two hours did [the trial Judge] accuse any police officers of ill-treating [the accused]’ not only lacked candour but could have led to allegations of misrepresentation of the judgment,” said Mr Holmes.
After his acquittal, the man declined to engage further with any police investigation into his assault allegations.
The second prosecution
In May 1980, a further person was arrested and interviewed regarding PIRA membership and the bombing of La Mon House, together with other explosions, and the hijacking of vehicles.
He admitted to involvement in the hijacking of the Fiat car used to transport the bomb to La Mon House and to being party to planting the bomb.
In 1981, after originally entering a ‘not guilty’ plea, he pleaded guilty to 12 charges of manslaughter, and to other offences, and received 12 life sentences.
He is the only person to have been convicted in relation to the La Mon House bombing.
Loss of documentation
The loss of records and exhibits from the original RUC investigation was central to the concerns raised by the survivors and families, and has been called ‘frustrating’ by Mr Holmes.
“My ability to provide a definitive view on the effectiveness of the RUC investigation, including whether all appropriate lines of enquiry were pursued, has been hindered by the unavailability of certain documentation generated by the investigation.
“It has not been possible to establish the circumstances in which these records were lost. However, this is a recurring, systemic issue in legacy cases and is not unique to this investigation”.
Nonetheless, Police Ombudsman investigators were able to access the majority of records generated by the RUC investigation, including substantial files of evidence prepared for the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) for the two prosecutions.
These records did offer insight into the direction and progress of the police investigation at the time and led the Police Ombudsman’s investigation to conclude that the initial response to the attack was prompt and well-managed.
“The first police officers to attend the scene displayed courage and professionalism in seeking to save lives and tend to the injured,” said Mr Holmes.
“The Senior Investigating Officer made swift arrests and ensured widespread coverage of the incident in the media, seeking witnesses to come forward.
“More than 100 detectives were involved in the murder investigation and almost 400 statements were recorded. Scenes were identified and exhibits seized, and forensic examinations took place.
“In the context of the significant pressures and challenges faced by the RUC at that time, I am of the view that the investigation was well resourced and received direction from the highest levels of the RUC,” he concluded.
Police Ombudsman investigators did identify a number of enquiries which do not appear to have been actioned by the RUC investigation, among them the failure to conduct enquiries regarding the second bomb warning call.
After the telephone warning was given to a 999 operator, another person came on the line. When asked where the call was being made from, the person replied it was from a pay phone at the Glenowen Inn on the Glen Road in West Belfast.
However, no documentation could be found indicating that police conducted enquiries to identify and interview this second person or pursued other evidential opportunities at the Glenowen Inn.
From interviews with suspects and witness evidence, police established that there were two cars used in the bombing.
A yellow Fiat, which had been stolen in West Belfast earlier in the day and was used to drive the bomb to La Mon House, was later abandoned close to the restaurant. A red Volkswagen Golf then picked up the bombers and brought them back to West Belfast.
Police Ombudsman investigators were unable to establish what efforts the RUC investigation team made to trace the red Volkswagen or anyone connected to it.
Loss of exhibits
The RUC investigation recovered numerous exhibits, from the scene of the bombing, cars that were seized, clothing and samples from suspects, and samples for the purposes of identifying the deceased.
Once victims were identified, exhibits recovered for the purposes of their identification became less important to the investigation. However, a significant number of exhibits, which are now unaccounted for, had the potential to be evidentially important to any future police investigation.
The Police Ombudsman investigation has not been able to account for the missing exhibits. However, it is possible that they were held at the Forensic Laboratory at Newtownbreda which was destroyed in a PIRA bomb in 1992.
One of the retained exhibits, the ends from adhesive tape which was found in the remains of the explosive device, was re-examined for the presence of DNA by the PSNI’s Historical Enquiries Team in 2010.
Although no profile was obtained due to the insufficient quantity of DNA, forensic science has advanced yet further, leading the Police Ombudsman investigation to conclude that further analysis may provide for further DNA opportunities.
Liaison between the RUC and victims’ families
Incomplete records also prevented the Police Ombudsman investigation from definitively establishing the extent of communication between the RUC and the victims’ families or those representing them.
At that time, family liaison was very different to contemporary policing practice and standards, and there was no structured contact system in place and no formal training existed.
The Police Ombudsman investigation was able to confirm only that a Major Incident Room was established at Newtownards police station and that a Casualty Bureau was also quickly set up at Castlereagh RUC station after the bombing. It was staffed by a team of dedicated officers for the purposes of coordinating the identification of victims and liaison with family members.
Blocking of fire exit
Witnesses provided harrowing accounts of their attempts to escape the room which bore the full force of the explosion, and provided evidence that exit doors into an adjacent room were blocked by a large cabinet.
The extent to which the blocking of the fire exit contributed to the deaths and injuries of guests would have been a legitimate line of enquiry for the RUC investigation.
However, the available police investigation material does not indicate that thorough enquiries were undertaken in respect of the obstruction.
Allegations of collusion
A number of allegations of collusion were made to the Police Ombudsman.
They centred on concerns that informants may have been involved in the bombing, and, as a result, that the RUC may have had information which may have prevented the attack, and that informants may have been protected by police.
A newspaper article published in 2012 concerning the alleged involvement of two individuals in the bombing, one of whom was named, and the fact that Special Branch officers were involved in interviewing suspects, heightened the suspicion of collusion.
The investigation did establish that Special Branch officers had significant involvement in the interviews of many of those arrested.
In the initial 22 arrests which took place between 18 and 23 February 1978, some 300 police interviews were undertaken, of which Special Branch conducted two thirds.
The Police Ombudsman investigation was unable to locate contemporaneous records of the majority of these interviews, although investigators had access to details of the dates, times and duration of interviews and by whom they were conducted.
Investigators established that although initial interviews of suspects were generally conducted by CID officers, there were occasions when Special Branch were the sole interviewers. The limited number of surviving interview notes reflect that where Special Branch were the first to interview suspects, they were questioned about the bombing of La Mon House.
“This tends to support the suggestion that in addition to their main function of intelligence gathering, Special Branch were deployed to augment available CID resources, and that this was the prevailing practice at that time,” said Mr Holmes
In specific reference to the newspaper article, the Police Ombudsman’s Office will neither confirm nor deny that the named individual, or any other individual, was an informant.
However, the investigation did not see evidence or intelligence that would support the broader reference contained within the article of malpractice by police officers.
Significant volumes of intelligence were reviewed with the aim of establishing whether information existed that, if acted upon, could have prevented the bombing, and whether relevant intelligence was shared by Special Branch with detectives investigating the bombing.
The investigation identified no intelligence which could have forewarned of, or prevented, the bombing.
A person was arrested in June 1991 on suspicion of other serious terrorist offences. Despite previous intelligence linking him to the bombing, there is no record of him having been questioned about the La Mon House bombing and nor is there a documented rationale for the omission.
The investigation did not find evidence that any police officer sought to ‘protect’ any individual from investigation or prosecution.
Mr Holmes commented:
“The substantial police investigation files, associated documentation and intelligence records reviewed by this Office, together with explanatory accounts from a number of former police officers and other enquiries, lead me to conclude that there was earnest endeavour by the RUC to bring those responsible for the bombing of La Mon House to justice.
“However, maintenance of the investigation did not have the same rigour and this manifested in the loss of investigative material and the failure to interview the person arrested in 1991 in relation to the bombing.
“I am of the view, based on all available evidence and information, that collusive behaviours were not a feature of this RUC investigation.
“The evidence and intelligence viewed by the Police Ombudsman’s investigation attributes responsibility for directing, enabling and perpetrating the bombing of La Mon House to the Provisional IRA,” concluded Mr Holmes.
Mr Holmes thanked the victims’ families and survivors for their patience in awaiting the outcome of the investigation.